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The IRGC, or the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Iran have utilized soft power to 
increase their influence within the Middle East. By using military superiority; ideological 
influence; and trade, both the Iran and the IRGC established dependency between themselves 
and patron states. Of these patron states, the research focuses on Iraq; Syria; and Yemen, and 
how Iran and the IRGC affect them through soft power. This research suggests that Iran and the 
IRGC is using the disability of the aforementioned states to increase their own influence by 
making them dependent on Iranian military supplies; cultural indoctrination to align with Iranian 
ideology; and economic dependent on Iran. As Iran’s influence grows within these states, its 
power in the Middle East grows and becomes a security risk for Saudi Arabia; Israel; and any 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Thesis 
Evidence suggests that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or 
the IRGC, is active in destabilized regions through the use of soft 
power tactics in an attempt to garner greater regional influence. In 
doing so, the IRGC is amassing influence in a global scale through 
increased funding and improved political and economic relations 
with state governments or non-state actors.  
Iran has been ostracized by the international community for their 
support of terrorist organizations that propagate war and their 
ambitions to become a nuclear power. The international 
community has also implemented policies against the Iranian 
regime in order to force policy reform, as exemplified by economic 
sanctions and political separation. In response to the international 
communities’ attempt to influence Iranian politics, both the Iranian 
regime and the IRGC utilize their presence in other countries to 
counteract any political and economic loss. Through the use of 
creating a greater military dependency; increased ideological 
connection; and economic soft power with foreign countries, Iran 
and the IRGC are creating clientele states to secure international 
power. The following countries will be used in a case study 
examination: Iraq; Syria; and Yemen. By analyzing the extent of 
influence that the IRGC and Iran has to the aforementioned 
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countries, the benefits of their relationship can establish a 
correlation between the profiteering of their destabilized 
government and Iran.  
The significance of the topic 
Since the fall of the former Soviet Union, there has been a 
proliferation of civil wars in the global sphere. Typically, these 
wars take place in regions that have low to moderate stability, such 
as the Middle East. These areas have seen large migrants crisis that 
have affected the world politically; socially; and economically. In 
better understanding how foreign actors affect civil wars, e.g., the 
prolonging of civil wars and greater disability, then the 
international community can better understand how to react to civil 
wars and the interests that foreign actors typically have. For 
example, Iran has taken advantage of the civil conflicts that have 
occurred in Iraq; Syria; and Yemen. They have garnered a large 
inflow of power that could signify that sanctions and other counter 
measures that aim to counter Iranian activities will not affect them, 
because they have become self-dependent on their own means of 
power accruement. With the amount of success that Iran has 
achieved, this will also signify that they will continue their tactics 
of profiting from the further destabilization of other countries by 
establishing soft power dominance. Venezuela, which has one of 
the largest petroleum reserves, is already receiving assistance from 
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Iran and so are certain countries in Africa, e.g., Nigeria. These 
interactions could become pre-cursers to further destabilization 
within these areas that will have been planned by the Iranian 
regime. By understanding Iran’s actions, there format can also be 
used to understand the interaction that countries like Russia and 
China have in areas of low stability, as well.  
The Opinion of the Literature 
The opinion of the literature that discusses Iran; the IRGC; and 
their support for likeminded militia groups to gain increase power, 
which causes Iran to become destabilized, is supportive of my 
argument. One of the most essential themes that gives perceived 
legitimacy to the domestic and international actions of the IRGC is 
their role in the Iranian constitution and the ideology of the 
exportation of their revolution1The IRGC was created to aid in the 
Islamic Revolution that took place in 1979 and would be 
maintained in order to over watch the actions of Iranian military 
that served the Shah and to export the Islamic revolution to other 
countries and protect it within Iran2. The interpretation of 
protecting the revolution within Iran has been a point of contention 
because the IRGC has transcended a militaristic guardianship role 
and become a political and economic entity that works beyond the 
control of the Iranian Government3. The Domestic role of the 
IRGC has been one of suppression and violent intervention when it 
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believes that the citizenry of Iran is beginning to make strides to 
make their dissatisfaction known. The Basij organization, which is 
a branch of the IRGC, has been tasked with policing Iranian cities 
and maintaining peace and organization within the country4. 
However, the Basij, which has poorly trained youths who are 
driven by ideology to radicalize its members, has taken violent 
countermeasures to counteract dissidents of the regime. This takes 
the form of beatings; killings; and imprisonment of student 
protesters; political opponents of the regime; and so on5. The 
IRGC also has a foreign presence that is known as the Quds force. 
The Quds force is tasked with the direct assistance of militia 
groups that it deems to meet the requirements of support by the 
Iranian government. This criterion usually is targeted towards 
Shiite groups and militia groups that target Iran’s enemies, such as 
the GCC states and the western world6. Quds is most active in 
regions that have a large Shiite presence, e.g., Syria; Lebanon; and 
Iraq, and their actions range in training; funding; dedication of 
soldiers; arms trade; and so on7. Quds is also supporting 
organizations that have similar interests such as their own. For 
example, Quds funds Hamas, the defacto Gaza Strip government 
that takes violent and illegal actions against Israel in order to vie 
for freedom. Quds is also supporting the Houthi rebels because of 
their military campaign against Saudi Forces and the attempt to 
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overthrow the monarchy of Yemen. Quds even extends their 
influence past Middle Eastern states and have a presence in South 
America and in Eastern European countries8. The IRGC itself also 
coordinates with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security in order 
to gather intelligence to give guidance to the Basij; the IRGC; and 
the Quds force9. The power dynamic of the IRGC is growing as the 
Iranian regime continuously gives power to the IRGC. Currently, 
the IRGC relies on the Iranian regime as its legitimacy as an 
organization stems from the legitimacy for the Iranian regime. But 
while the IRGC has a firm grip on the domestic policies of Iran, its 
expansionist policies has promulgated destabilization throughout 
the Middle East, specifically: Iraq; Syria; and Yemen. Within all 
three states, the IRGC has focused on its usage of soft power to 
establish patronage between the aforementioned states with both 
the IRGC and Iran. Through the use of the IRGC’s exceptional 
training and network of trade routes, it is able to supply weaponry 
and training to organizations that fulfill their interests. The IRGC 
has also exploited cultural links, e.g., religion, to garner support 
within states and to use religion as an avenue to spread an justify 
Iran’s revolutionary ideology and anti-western ideology. Through 
economic soft power, the IRGC establishes bi-lateral trade 
agreements that favor both itself and the Iranian regime by 
establishing deals that sees a large inflow of Iranian products and 
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IRGC business growth within a country. For example, Iraq imports 
more Iranian products than Iran imports Iraqi products. The IRGC 
also uses its construction companies in an attempt to restore the 
infrastructure of countries once war has subsided. With the IRGC 
gaining substantial power through the use of soft power influence 
internationally, it will most likely trade the use of hard power for 
soft power in order to discreetly gain more influence. With regions 
such as Venezuela; Nigeria; Tajikistan; and other unstable regions 
that do not have international actors support their infrastructure, 
Iran will be able to fill said position.  
How the Topic fits 
My topic fits in the literature by explaining the connection that Iran 
and the IRGC have within the Middle East. I give special attention 
to the IRGC because as an organization, it has the ability to 
transcend the Iranian regime by achieving a level of self-autonomy 
that is also free of international influence from non-state actors, 
e.g., the UN and the World Bank. The IRGC has gained the most 
influence when referencing the use of soft power in foreign 
regions. This is because of the dependency that these states and 
non-state actors form with the IRGC and not the Iranian regime 
through the receiving of military aid; cultural influence; and 
economic assistance. While the IRGC has the ability to transcend 
other organizations, it is the domestic Iranian regime that is the 
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largest obstacle. The IRGC is dependent on the relationship that it 
has with the Supreme Leader, because the appointment of the 
IRGC commander is decided by the Supreme Leader. In addition, 
its legitimacy is linked to the Supreme Leader because its inception 
was suggested by the former Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini. With the relationship between the IRGC and the Iranian 
regime in consideration, it can be predicted that the IRGC will 
attempt to consolidate power within their regime legitimately 
through power and influence increase. This power increase can be 
achieved through its increased presence within foreign states and 
will create an avenue for further expansion domestically and 
internationally. Wars such as the ones that took and that are 
currently taking place in Iraq; Syria; and Yemen will also be 
understood as concept models. This is because the accruement of 
power that the IRGC and Iran has within the aforementioned states 
follow a pattern that can be used to understand how the former and 
latter will attempt to consolidate power in other foreign arenas.  
Research Design 
There will be five sections within this study. The Introduction will 
be the proposal of my study and it will describe my thesis; the 
significance of the topic; the current opinion of the literature; and 
how my research affects the current literature. The second 
paragraph will go over a brief overview of the IRGC; its structure; 
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and its functions. Afterwards, the chapter will begin to discuss the 
interests that the IRGC has within Iraq. The third and fourth 
paragraph will follow a similar design to the Iraq chapter, as all 
three will focus on the IRGC and the Iranian regime’s soft power 
influence within the aforementioned states. At the end of the first; 
second; and third chapter will be a historical chronological order 
will discuss the evolving level of influence that both Iran and the 
IRGC has had within said nation-states. The conclusion of the 
research will begin by answering the research question through a 
synthesis of the findings of the first; second; and third case study. 
Then a synopsis will be given regarding the case studies and their 
findings. The conclusion will end with a perspective on the future 
outlook of the countries that the IRGC is present in and of the 











Chapter II: IRGC: Nature; Forum; and Functions 
The History of the IRGC 
Brief Summary of its changing nature 
Kenneth Katzman is the first contemporary scholar to publish 
detailed research on the IRGC.10 The IRGC has attempted to 
solidify its legitimacy with the rationale that it is the defender of 
the Islamic Revolution and for its role in reconstructing Iran after 
the Iran-Iraq War11. The IRGC was established originally to 
monitor and replace the Artesh, which at this point was the 
remained of the Shah’s military. It was on May 5, 1979 that 
Ayatollah Khomeni declared the creation of Sepah-e Pasdaran-e 
Enghelab-e Islami or the Army of the Guardians of the 
Revolution12. 
Goals  
 The IRGC is tasked with nine primary duties by the Revolutionary 
Courts13: 
1. Aiding the police and security forces in the removal of 
counterrevolutionary  
2. Combating counterrevolutionaries 
3. Defense against foreign aggression 
4. Coordinating with Iran’s armed forces  




6. Assisting in the implementation of the Islamic Revolution  
7. Supporting likeminded militia groups and oppressed Muslims.  
8. To aid in catastrophic events 
9.  promulgate the resources that the IRGC has at its disposal14 
Structure 
The Regular IRGC 
After the creation of the IRGC, the new military organization was 
tasked with not just phasing out the Shah’s Artesh force, but with 
monitoring the Kurds of Iran and the communist Mujahedin force, 
which posed as threats to the stability of Iran.15 The IRGC would 
undergo skirmishes that became violent against the former and 
latter, and this form of policing would persist even during the Iran-
Iraq war, or the great defense.16  
During the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC gained greater power as the 
creation of the IRGC Navy and Air Force was authorized to aid in 
the war effort. However, what caused the IRGC to gain the most 
authority was their inclusion into the Iranian political field and 
market. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that the IRGC should not be 
involved in Iranian politics because it would undermine corrupt 
IRGC interests from a militaristic organization to a politicized 
military group1718. While the IRGC contested that their 
constitutional objective of protecting the Islamic Revolution meant 
that they needed a political presence, it was the ascension of 
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Ayatollah Ali Khamenei that gave the IRGC the most political 
power. When the former President Ali Khatami took office, his 
reformist views became a threat to Khamenei and saw the IRGC 
and the Basij force as allies due to symbiotic relationship of the 
IRGC and Supreme Leader. That is when IRGC veterans began to 
take positions in political offices in order to counteract the growing 
influence of reformists1920.  
During the 1992-1993 period, then President of Iran Rafsanjani, 
proposed and allowed government entities, such as the IRGC, to 
begin initiating their own business transactions to create separate 
income2122. The IRGC created numerous business ventures that 
ranges from construction companies to telecommunications, but 
their most influential venture are bonyads, or foundations. Under 
the foundations, the IRGC is able to distribute loans and other 
forms of economic support to gain the favor of the populace and to 
incentivize conscription and support for the IRGC23. 
The IRGC has transitioned from a policy enforcing institution into 
a policy creating institution. With the political; economic; and 
social capabilities of the IRGC, it has amassed enough power 
within Iran and abroad to challenge the government of Iran as the 




In order for the IRGC to fulfill its constitutional objective, the 
IRGC established the Basij, which stands for Mobilization in 
Persian, and the Quds force. The Basij force, a subordinate militia 
of the IRGC, was established under the guises of being a program 
for military training for Iranian citizens. This was to ensure that all 
citizens would be able to defend Iran from any potential domestic 
or foreign threat2425. Many Basij members were deployed 
alongside the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq war and this would result 
in the deaths of thousands, as Basij members received little to no 
training26. While the Basij is expected to stabilize Iranian society, 
it is often correlated with corruption and human rights violations27. 
Most supporters of the Basij are hardliners who believe that the 
Islamic Republic should follow a strong, theocratic approach to 
government2829303132.  
The Quds Force 
The Quds force, or the Jerusalem force, which its fighters have 
promised to liberate from Israel, was established to aid in the 
IRGC’s constitutional obligation to aid in the exportation of the 
Islamic Revolution33. The Quds force main area of operation is in 
foreign theaters of conflict in which they offer training; equipment; 
money; and troops support to like-minded militia groups34. The 
Quds force has been active in Iraq by giving support and training 
to the Shi’a militias of southern Iraq since the inception of their 
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force. Iraq is of geographical importance to the Iranian regime 
because it is a gateway to the Levant. The Levant itself is essential 
to Iranian politics because of Lebanon; Israel; Palestine; and Syria. 
Hizbollah, an important ally to Iran, is based in Lebanon; the 
Assad regime supports Iran; HAMAS operates in the Gaza strip; 
and Israel is an enemy of Iran35. Therefore, by Iran improving its 
presence and coordination with Iraq, Iran is able to supply 
Lebanon; Palestine; and Syria with resources. In addition, Iran’s 
increasing influence in the Levant will put Israel at a greater state 
of vulnerability, which will also allow Iran to pressure the United 
States. 
Intelligence: Ministry of Intelligence and Security 
Little is known about Iran’s Intelligence and Security apparatus, 
but their historical roots and adaptation from the Shah’s Sazman-e 
Ettela’at va Amniat-e Keshvar, or SAVAK, organization can give 
an improvised understanding of their function. SAVAK was 
established by the assistance of both the United States and Israel 
and its responsibilities would include countering internal 
opposition and communists/leftist parties within Iran36. After the 
1979 revolution, Iranian intelligence adopted the model 
intelligence platform of the typical revolutionary group. This 
included assassinating defectors and identifying internal opposition 
movements and individuals for eventual eradication37. Iranian 
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Intelligence was primarily constructed from tips and leads from the 
Palestinian Liberation Unit and Kumitehs, which were established 
by Ayatollah Khomeini to counter possible police forces that were 
loyal to the Shah38. Eventually, the Revolutionary government 
established various intelligence agencies, of which, Sazman 
Ettela’at va Amniar Melli Iran, or SAVAMA, was the most 
prestigious. SAVAMA was built on the foundation of SAVAK, it 
would use the same methods of SAVAK to collect intelligence and 
to conduct operations39. Eventually, a plethora of intelligence 
offices would be formed and internal disarray began. In August 
1983, the Iranian Parliament approved the formation of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or MOIS, 
by combining the most experienced intelligence apparatuses40. 
MOIS was tasked with developing an intelligence presence that 
rivaled their enemies and were expected to target external enemies 
of the Iranian Revolution41. One of the main objectives of MOIS is 
to assist the IRGC in logistics; communication among the 
operatives; and documents needed for their operations42. 
The Power Structure of the IRGC 
The IRGC and its influence is hypothetically dictated by complex 
system of bureaucracy. The IRGC is commanded by the Joint 
Armed Forces General Staff, which unites the IRGC and the 







The IRGC’s autonomy was reduced by the creation of the Ministry 
of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics because it would mean 
another institution that the IRGC had to be delegated by44. The 
IRGC also is adjudicated by the Supreme National Security 
Council. This council is compromised by the President; the 
Defense and Foreign Ministers; the commander of the 












Chapter III:  IRGC and Iranian Socio-Economic Soft Power 
Influence in Iraq 
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The Importance of Iraq to the IRGC and Iran 
Controlling Iraq is a key strategic necessity for Iran if it is to 
increase its influence throughout the Middle East. Tactically, Iraq 
is the gateway to the Levant for Iran, and with stronger 
relationships with Iraq, Iran will be more apt to support Hezbollah; 
the Assad Regime; target Saudi Arabia and Israel; and have 
stronger relationships with Turley. Iraq’s majority population is of 
Shi’a orientation and this is a common religious/cultural 
background gives Iranian politics a pivot for control over Iraq. 
Another important aspect regarding Iraq’s importance is its 
Kurdish population in the North. By improving relations with the 
Iraqi Kurds, Iran will be able to improve relations with the Kurds 
that reside within Iran. The Kurdish population that resides in Iran 
has been one of the most concerning domestic actors of Iran 
because of the possibility to incite violence throughout multiple 
regions. Iraq’s political alliance should be the most concern for 
Iran because Iraq is currently considered an ally to the United 
States. If Iran is to gain control of the Iraqi state, then it would 
have secured its position in the Middle East even more simply be 
removing an ally to the United States.  
Military Power 
Iranian Back Militias and Daesh 
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In 2007, a report that focused on militia activity within Iraq has 
stated that over 50 percent of attacks on coalition forces have been 
supported by Iran46. Prior to the invasion of Daesh in Iraq, Iran 
would supply and educate Shi’a militias on the various forms of 
explosives that could be used against the American supported 
coalitions. These explosives ranged in the forms of mortars; 
roadside bombs; and IEDs47. Iran’s support of Shi’a militias was 
direct, but it was not substantial enough to help the Shi’a majority 
gain greater control of the Iraqi polity. What gave leeway to the 
Iraqi Shi’as and Iran to have greater influence would be the arrival 
of Daesh in Iraq. In 2014, Daesh, a Salifi terrorist organization that 
has state interests invaded Iraq in 2014. Daesh began to target 
Shi’a groups because they were declared as heretics against Islam, 
or the more popular Sunni Islam. In response to the growing threat 
of Daesh Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, an Iranian Cleric that oversees 
religious duties in Iraq, made a Fatwa, or a religious declaration, 
for Shi’a muslims to come together to fight back Daesh48.  
The Popular Mobilization Unit 
The Popular Mobilization Unit, or the PMU, a Shi’a militant group 
was established as a result of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s fatwa49. 
Just as previous Shi’a groups before the PMU, the IRGC oversaw 
the organization’s funding; training; and coordination. As the fight 
against Daesh continued, the PMU became the largest military unit 
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in Iraq. It was considered so popular because the Shi’a population 
felt galvanized to the military unit, as it was established by the 
Shi’a for the Shi’a50. In addition, many recruits stated that the 
PMU was a desirable alternative than the military of Iraq because 
the PMU was considered less corrupt than the Iraqi army51. 
Allegations of corruption are rampant in Iraq as stories such as 
50,000 “ghost soldiers” who were on the government’s payroll but 
did not physically exist are widely accepted52. The PMU is also a 
popular alternative because PMU soldiers are paid higher wages 
than they would if they were in the Iraqi military53. As years of 
conflict continued, the PMU were able to play an important role in 
liberating Iraq from Daesh. The PMU were so influential that the 
Iraqi Parliament passed a law to transform the PMU into a 
separate, official, and permanent military corps54. The PMU’s 
popularity in Iraq became evident because the majority of the 
Shi’a; Sunni; and Kurdish members of the Iraqi Parliamentarians 
supported the PMU’s transition into a permanent military force55. 
While the Iraqi paradigm has a positive perspective of the PMU, 
there are certain concerns about the inclusion of the PMU into 
Iraq’s military. One is that the PMU exists to defender and remain 
loyal to a Shi’a centered Iraq56. Shi’a influence is on the rise in 
Iraq and that is because sectarianism is becoming the primary form 
of identity politics with Iraq, as nationalism no longer has much 
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influence57. As a result, a stronger preference to the Shi’a identity 
will give the IRGC a basis to increase their presence in Iraq 
further. The PMU also has a regional role that is linked to Iran’s 
interests to having increased influence over Iraq. The PMU will 
give Iran further hegemonic goals that are rooted in economic; 
political; and social dominance. The PMU will also have the 
ability to bridge a political connection between Iraq and Iran 
because PMU leaders will campaign in the national elections of 
2018 and use their military experiences as a platform for their 
campaign58. The PMU has the potential of transforming the power 
influx of Iraq into a Shi’a dominated country, and with the help of 
the IRGC, this is a likely possibility.  
Political Influence 
Since the fall of Saddam’s regime, Iran has attempted to increase 
its influence within Iraq in order to destabilize the region through 
the empowerment of the Shi’a majority. The objective is to create a 
weak state that will amenable to Iranian influence. The Iraqi Shi’a 
population is estimated to be around 60 percent, which Iran has 
ensured to support through its Political Parties. IN addition, Iran 
has supported Northern Iraqi Kurdistan politically to maintain a 
strong relationship with Northern Iraq59. Iran has supported 
political entities such as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, or 
ISCI; the Badr Organization; The Islamic Dawa Party; and the 
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Sadrists. Iran also advises and funds its preferred candidates during 
parliamentary elections and in provincial elections, as it has done 
in 2005; 2009; and 201060. In 2014, Nouri al-Maliki, the secretary 
general of the Islamic Dawa Party and a Vice President of Iraq, 
secured 94 seats in Parliament61. Nouri al-Malki is a close ally of 
Iran, and his power over parliament translates to to greater Iranian 
influence over the Iraqi polity. It should be expected that Iran will 
play a greater role in Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary elections, as PMU 
services members and other Iranian allies will find great support 
from Iran. The historical connections between Iran and the 
aforementioned parties is that the IRGC controlled and trained the 
militias that belonged to the ISCI and the Badr Organization62. It 
was after the fall of Saddam Hussein that former military members 
of the ISCI militias and the Badr Organization returned to Iraq and 
began to secure positions in the Iraqi ,military and political life. 
Iran has become a powerful entity in the Iraqi polity, and as Shi’a 
forces begin to gain greater political control, then the goal of a 
united Shi’a state will become a reality and a powerful ally to both 
Iran and the IRGC.  
Ideological Infleunce 
Religious Influence 
Iraq, much like Iran, is ethnically compromised of a Shi’a 
majority, which establishes a common ground between both 
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aforementioned countries through religion. However, religious 
leaders within Iraq, specifically Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, are 
suspicious of Iran because of their desire to establish velayat-e 
faghih, or rule of supreme jurisprudence from Iran63.  While Iran’s 
religious influence is too great within Iraq, the close proximity; the 
large influx of pilgrims between countries; and growing authority 
from the Shi’a majority within Iraq are few of many incentives for 
Iran to change their lukewarm relations64. The obstacle that proves 
to be the most bothersome to Iran is the Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani, as he holds a negative opinion towards growing Iraqi 
influence within Iraq. Even though Sistani funds thousands of 
religious scholars to study in Iran, the Ayatollah warns his 
followers, who are 80% of the world’s Shi’a population, to be 
wary of Iranian velayat-e faghih in Iraq65. In order to curtail the 
negative feelings of a religious interconnection between Iran and 
Iraq, Iran has begun to fund religious foundations; build religious 
schools; mosques; and medical clinics in heavily concentrated 
Shi’a regions within Baghdad; Najaf; and other Shi’a centers. The 
Iranian regime has also been accounting to counter Ali Sistani in 
the form of grooming other potential successors for the Ayatollah 
passes. An example is low ranking clerics such as Seyyed 
Mohamad Tabtabi promotes Iranian ideology within his sermons66. 
However, regardless of Iran’s ambitions, they cannot ensure that 
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they will have a replacement that is loyal to the regime when 
Sistani passes, as his influence is not an appointed role, rather, his 
power comes from emulation and respect conferred to him by 
every Shi’a follower67. Iran has also used pilgrimages made by 
Iranian Shi’a adherents into Iraq as a form to expand their 
influence. This takes the form of the construction of tourist 
facilities and the improvement of transit routes that are funded by 
Iran. For example, Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC 
Quds force, spear-headed the construction of a road from the 
Diyala province into the Samarra province in Iraq, as a sign that 
Iran is supportive of the local Shi’a population68. 
 
Education 
In the aftermath of the armed conflicts that occurred within Iraq, 
Iran has offered to help improve the education system. Iran’s 
Islamic Azad University is planning to open new branches within 
Iraq, with Velayati, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali 
Khamenei, has stressed that educational issues must be helped69. 
The universities main focus is to create the next generation of 
“Resistance,” which is a term that is correlated with those that fight 
Israel, the United States, and other enemies of Iran70. The 
university is anticipating in opening branches in Karbala; Najafl 
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After the fall of Saddam Hussain, Iranian television were some of 
the first channels to reach the homes of Iraqis.72 By using 
transmitters near the Iranian-Iraqi border, Iran has been able to 
transmit programs that portray Iran as the protectors of Iraq from 
foreign invasive forces73. With the use of these transmitters, Iran 
can also broadcast other forms of materials that aims to persuade 
the Iraqi public to form a positive opinion of the Iranian regime 
and their interaction with the Iraqi polity. An example is Al-Alam, 
a 24 hour news program that broadcasts news from the Iranian 
perspective that exploits the ever changing political landscape74. 
Economic Soft Power 
IRGC Economic Apparatuses  
In seeking to control all areas of Iranian society, the IRGC has 
taken the appropriate measures to increase its economic control 
over the Iraqi domain. It is reported that the IRGC controls up to 
one sixth of the declared GDP of Iran75. The sectors that the IRGC 
operates in, but are not limited to banking; telecommunications; 
oil; gas; and construction76. Of the most influential companies that 
is under IRGC control is the engineering firm, Khatam al-Anbya 
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Construction Headquarters. This construction company has stated 
that it has completed over 1,800 projects77. The IRGC would also 
have control of economic organizations that were established from 
the confiscation of wealth from the upper class and pre-Shah 
institutions78. The IRGC would control foundations, or bonyads, 
that are tax-exempt; government subsidized; and populist led 
organizations. Examples of these bonyads that are under the 
control of the IRGC are the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans 
Affairs and the Foundation of the Oppressed79. Some of the most 
recently established foundations are the IRGC Cooperative 
Foundation, which was formed by IRGC commanders to structure 
the IRGC’s investments80. The IRGC Cooperative Foundation has 
also established Ansar Bank to serve IRGC members and Mehr 
Bank to service Basij members, both of which are controlled by the 
foundation81. The IRGC has also employed Liner Transport Kish 
to support terrorist activities outside of Iran, such as providing 
shipping services to Hizballah82. There are various companies that 
are owned by the IRGC and not many have been designated as 
affiliates of the IRGC. It is important to study and be aware of the 
economic might that the IRGC is becoming.83 
 
IRGC Technology Programs and  
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 Iraq is a client state of the IRGC’s services, and the 
economic activity in Iran is a form of soft power that the IRGC 
exploits to gain further control over the countries’ polity. 
Telecommunication Company of Iran has made an agreement with 
Iraq in 2011 to develop a communication network in the towns of 
Karbaka and Najaf in Iraq.84 TCI representatives have stated that 
the billion-dollar project that connects from Iran into Iraq will 
allow Iraq to expand its communication networks throughout the 
country.85 Both Iran and Iraq have also decided that they will work 
together to create a joint stamp printing system that will be utilized 
for both countries.86 Iraq has traditionally been an important 
trading partner with Iran, and that is because the close proximity of 
both states would typically made trade inevitable. In 2014, a free 
trade agreement was signed between the Iranian and Iraqi regime, 
however, there has been limitations in the trade deal being 
implemented. 
 
IRGC Building Iraqi Infrastructure  
 The IRGC has a control over petroleum products, however, 
there are other companies that work in conjunction with the IRGC 
to compliment the growth of one another. One is known as the 
Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines, or IRISL, and this 
company also has companies that are involved in the extraction 
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and exportation of petroleum by products87. This pipeline is 
expected to begin in Iran and follow through Turkey and Syria 
until it reaches Europe.88 This pipeline is expected to be a $2.3 
billion dollar agreement that will see up to 4 million cubic meters 
of gas per day.89 While the free trade agreement has not be 
officially implemented, an agreement being reached signifies a 
desire for increase trade relations between the two countries. There 
are soccer stadiums that are being built in Iraq, and that is the Al-
Zawraa stadium and the Al-Tajiat stadium. These two stadiums are 
under construction by Iranian companies, and while it has not been 
disclosed as to which companies are building the stadiums, it 
should be known that IRGC construction companies undertake a 
majority of construction contracts. Iranian construction companies 
have also helped build dams in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, but it 
is argued that water has been redirected from the Kalal River and 
the Karun and Karkah rivers in order to undermine Iraqi 
agriculture90. This action has also resulted in the Basra province in 
Iraq to experience a drought that has lasted since 200791 
 
Trade 
The volume of trade between Iraq and Iran in 2017 has been the 
highest since 2003. It is reported that Iranian exports to Iraq 
amount to 13 billion USD and that his figured is the result of 
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Iranian exports doubling over 17 times over the past decade92. 
However, the trade balance between Iran and Iraq is heavily 
skewered because Iranian imports have relatively significant tax 
cuts while Iraqi imports suffer from large tariffs93.Of the items that 
Iran trades the most with Iraq, it is subsidized agricultural 
products.94 The stark difference in trade taxes is because of 
protectionist policies within the Iraqi polity that focuses on 
favoring Iran. Iran is also aiding Iraq with their electrical needs 
because Iraqi needs has outstripped the country’s ability to provide 
for the demand. However, many Iraqi’s argue that Iran manipulates 




Iran operates five banks in Iraq and this development has allowed 
Iraqi banks to open letters of credit with Iranian banks, which aid 
in promoting trade96. These banks are located in Baghdad; Najaf; 
and Karbala, areas that have communication lines running from 
Iran. I addition, bonyads and construction firms, which are 
controlled by the IRGC, are very active in the Shi’a South; 
Baghdad; and Kurdistan Regional Government. The bonyads and 
construction companies have helped build hospitals; clinics; and 
other essential infrastructure to have support within Iraq. In 
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addition, these institutions also lead housing construction in 
Southern Iraq, which will represent 150 billion USD market value 
nationwide97. 
 
 These aforementioned examples are case studies of how 
IRGC companies have infiltrated the Iraqi economy. By growing 
its economic influence within Iraq, the IRGC will have greater 
funding to provide services to its forces both domestic and abroad. 
In addition, the IRGC will have the opportunity to exploit its 
economic influence within Iraq by deciding to shut down 
operations or to limit productivity in an effort to cause policy 
change in Iraq to favor the IRGC.  
 Regarding the IRGC, it has been noted that the organization 
values its use of hard power. However, the IRGC is also adept at 
influencing the political sphere of countries through the use of soft 
powers.  
Conclusion 
2003 – The overthrow of Saddam Hussein 
After the removal of Saddam Hussein from the Iraqi Polity, Iran 
was in an advantageous position to improve its relationship with its 
neighbor. This form of relationship improvement came in the form 
of increasing border interaction; trade; the armament of military 
xxxv 
 
groups; and establishing strong political connection between Iraqi 
and Iranian Politicians in order to destabilize the government98 
2003-2009 
Iranian backed political organizations return to Iraq and relations 
between Iran and Iraq improve drastically. Iranian sympathizers 
begin to mobilize in the populated Southern Iraq movement and 
Iran supports many Shi’a politicians to win seats of representation 
in parliament and general positions of power. The Quds force also 
begins to arm Shi’a militants in order to help breed instability in 
areas that are supported by the United States government.  
2009- 2014 
Shi’a led political groups gain more power. Daesh invades Iraq and 
conquers northern Iraq and destabilizes the region. Iran begins to 
mobilize militant groups in Iraq to repel Daesh. The PMU is 
formed and it becomes the military organization that is most active 
in repelling Daesh.  
2014-Present 
Deash is repelled and the PMU is established as a permanent 
military organization in Iraq. Trade between Iran and Iraq reaches 
an all-time high in 2017, by having traded 17 billion USD worth of 
goods between the two nation-states. Iran receives contracts to aid 
in the construction of the infrastructure of Iran, which results in 
greater economic influence. Iranian supported politicians secure 
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multiple seats in Parliament and it is expected that Iran will 





















Chapter IV: IRGC and Iranian Socio-economic Soft Power 
Influence in Syria 
The Importance of Syria to the IRGC and Iran 
Since the aftermath of the Arab Spring within Syria. Iran has 
praised the level of destabilization that has occurred in the Gulf 
States and Northern Africa as “Islamic Awakenings” that were 
inspired from its own revolution. But when that “Islamic 
Awakening” reached Syria, the support of the Arab Spring quickly 
shifted to one of opposition claiming that the Arab Spring in Syria 
was a by-product of Western interference99. This shift in tone is 
because the Iranian regime needs Syria to remain a functioning 
authority in the Middle East to serve Iran’s interests. One of the 
most vital functions that Syria plays is that it aids the IRGC in 
supplying Iran’s most important ally, Hizbollah.100 Syria also is a 
member of the Iranian fashioned “Axis of Resistance” that was 
formed on the basis of resisting any form of influence that the 
United States and Israel attempts to enforce101. Syria is also an 
economic ally of Iran, as both countries have traded with one 
another and Syria has become a nexus of supplies that imports 
wares, e.g., weapons that are prohibited to be sold to Iran102. 
Socially. The Assad regime’s religious affiliation to Alawites, an 
offshoot of Shi’ism, has gravitated both countries together in 
sectarian similarities and resistance to terrorist organizations that 
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target Shi’a Muslims103. Syria has historically been one of the few 
allies that Iran has within the Middle East, and because of the role 
that it plays in supporting Hizbollah; its proximity to Israel; and its 
poor relations with Saudi Arabia; the United States; and other pro-
western forces, it is an ally that Iran cannot lose.  
Military Power 
Military Advisors 
The Iranian regime has not directly sent military forces to aid in 
the Syrian civil war, however, it has sent the IRGC and Quds force 
to act as military advisors to coordinate militia groups and to train 
the supporters of the Assad regime.104 In giving financial; 
technical; and educational support to the Shi’a militias and Assad 
regime105. Of the first set of training that the IRGC offered the 
Assad regime were techniques on how to suppress uprisings; 
unpopular protests; and social media/internet interruption.106 The 
IRGC’s training and advice from the experiences that the 
organization had in suppressing the Green Movement and the 1999 
student protest.107  
Syrian War Negotiations 
Throughout the peace talk negotiations within the Syrian Civil 
War, Iran has played an important role in the peace talk process. 
The influence that Iran has with the actual peace talk process is 
that they are prolonging the Syrian Civil War until main the 
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factions of the war, the Syrian Government and the rebel forces, 
come to an agreement that mainly appeases Iran.108 Iranian 
officials have claimed that the Iranian regime believes in a political 
solution, but that it must be a part of that political solution, which 
means that Iran will only negotiate with actors that it is willing to 
make peace with.109 It is evident that Iran is prolonging the war in 
Syria, and it is to Iran’s best interests in attempting to secure its 
position as regional hegemon to ensure that the war continues until 
western forces no longer support the rebels. The Syrian War has 
transformed from a civil conflict into a proxy war that has Iran as 
the main force in determining the duration of the war in Syria.  
Iranian Influence with Russia 
Russia has had a checkered pat with Syria, however, Syria is the 
closest ally to Russia in the Levant. Syria permits Russia to have 
naval bases within the country and to aid the Assad regime with its 
civil conflict, which helps create a position of international 
influence within the Middle East for Russia through Syria110111. 
Russia’s primary concern with the fall of the Assad regime is that 
it will greatly weaken Iran because Syria is an essential ally in 
connecting Iran with Hizbollah, but Iran also has numerous 
economic; political; and social interests within Iran112. While the 
war in Syria has caused many to question why Russia is defending 
the Assad regime, it should be considered that Iranian relationship 
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with Russia in coordinating in the Syrian front is increasing 
relationships between both parties and their influence within the 
area. While both Iran and Russia have not traditionally worked 
together: The Shah had staunch anti-Soviet ideals those feelings 
did not improve after the fall of the Shah113. It is speculated that 
Iran’s interests in becoming a nuclear power and investing in 
Russian resources to improve Iranian capabilities began dialogue 
for both countries to cooperate.114 Furthermore, both countries 
have similar political orientation in anti-western sentiments; both 
dear the resurgence of the Taliban; and greater Sunni influence.115 
Russian and Iranian influence have even increased to the point that 
Tehran joined the Customs Union, a Moscow-led free trade 
organization116. Iran and Russia have not operated as closely 
together than the Syrian war, and the outcome of the Syrian war 
will create an even greater alliance between Iran; Russia; and 
Syria, which will give Iran an even greater ally within the UN. The 
relationship between Iran and Russia being the made cause for 
Putin’s intervention in Syria is furthered because while Syria 
receives shipment of weaponry, it is Iran that pays for the delivery 
of the arms. When Russia is not able to directly deliver the 
firearms to Syria, Russia will send the weaponry to Iran so that the 
IRGC or Quds force may deliver the weapons on the behalf of 
Russia.117 Russia’s support for the Assad regime both in the UN 
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and the frontlines has assured the survival of the Assad regime, 
however, if Iran were not involved in the situation, then it is not 
likely that Russia would have supported the Assad regime.  
Ideological Influence 
Sectarian Dominance  
Syria is a diverse country with a variety of ethnicities and religions 
that compromise the social paradigm. The Alawite community, an 
offshoot of Shi’a Islam, currently wields the most authority within 
Syria, even though it compromises only 13 percent of the 
population. Since the ascent of Hafez Al-Assad’s rise to power in 
claiming the presidency.118 Positions of governmental authority 
have traditionally been assigned to loyal Alawite followers and this 
trend still persists with the current Syrian President, Bashar Al-
Assad119. The Al-Assad regime has been notorious for attacking its 
Sunni communities, as seen by the Hasam Massacre that saw 
20,000-40,000 Sunnis being killed to stop the spread of revolt 
against the Assad regime120. Since the Daesh occupation of Syrian 
territories and the Arab Spring, Iran has contributed to training and 
maintaining Assad’s dominance within Syria. This also is done 
through the utilization of Shi’a militias within Syria and the 
empowerment of Shi’a community at large.  
Iran has spearheaded the creation of multiple Shi’a militias to aid 
the Assad regime, the most prominent being the Shabiha militia, or 
xlii 
 
the National Defense Force, which will be referred to as the 
NDF.121 The NDF has been compared to the Iranian Basij for 
practicing aggressive tactics to secure authority in the Syrian 
domestic front, e.g., extortion; blackmail; kidnappings; and 
extrajudicial killings.122 The Quds commander, Qasem Soleimani, 
has been attributed with the creation of the NDF. During the 
beginning of the Syrian Civil War, 7,000 Iranian and Iraqi fighters 
have been deployed through the guidance of the Quds and general 
IRGC force to assist that Assad regime.123 Alongside the NDF, the 
IRGC has also coordinated with its allied groups to send 5,000 
Hizbollah fighters; 5,000 Iraqi Shi’a fighters; and 18,000 Afghan 
and Pakistani fighters to aid the Assad Regime124. The exact figure 
as to the extent of how many Shi’a fighters is still unknown 
because it is estimated that thousands of Shi’a militiamen have 
come to Syria to help defend Shi’a shrines and interests125. The 
large inflow of Shi’a fighters and their dominance over security 
within Syria has caused sectarian tension, as Sunni and Christian 
Syrians are weary of the power influx in the military influence that 
the Shi’a have in Syria. A top advisor to Ayatollah Khamenei has 
also stated that Iran must and will have an enduring military 
presence within Syria and Iraq in an effort to defend “Islamic 
Unity.”126 Khamenei’s advisor stated that Iran’s liaison furthered 
the justification for military occupation of Iraq and Syria by stating 
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that it must do so to combat potential Israeli and American 
incursion and to suppress any Kurdish attempt to challenge the 
governments of Iraq and Syria.127 
Iranian Education 
As basic infrastructure begins to re-open, Iran has focused on 
expanding its influence in the education field. One major Iranian 
institution that has recently been granted approval to open a 
satellite institution in Syria is the Islamic Azad University. Iranian 
officials have reached out to Al-Assad stating that Iran is prepared 
at any moment to construct Islamic Azad University branches in all 
the major cities of Syria128. Iranian officials have stated in 
establishing Iranian funded universities, it is to be expected that 
Shiite and Islamic culture will be focused on; the Persian language 
will be an essential language; and Iranian ideals will be 
promoted129. In addition, educational; charitable; and cultural 
organizations to indoctrinate young Shiites for Iran’s regional 
power struggle.130 Iranian officials emphasized the institutions like 
the Islamic Azad University is essential for training the next 
generation of resistance, a term used to describe Iranian areas of 
influence. It was also stated that the Basij organization should play 
a direct role in directing the social; cultural; and political direction 
of the Iranian backed educational communities within Syria. 131  
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Economic Soft Power  
Reconstructing Syria 
In the aftermath of the occupation of Syrian cities, the task of 
reconstructing the Syrian infrastructure became a source of income 
and an avenue of power aggregation for Iran and the IRGC. In 
January 8th, 2018, The Syrian Prime Minister Imad Khamis gave 
all Iranian companies priorities in bidding for contracts that 
focused on the reconstruction of Syrian cities132. In addition, the 
meeting assured Iranian delegates that the Syrian government will 
add incentives to persuade Iranian companies to take part in the 
Syrian reconstruction and to have a direct role in the Syrian 
market133. The Commander of the IRGC, Major General 
Mohammad Ali Jafari, also stated It has been disclosed that the 
IRGC will lead the reconstruction effort within Syria instead of 
private companies in order to assure that Syria will also remain 
secured134.  
The IRGC has also secured multiple contracts that focuses on 
rebuilding the electrical grids for Syria and has begun to work 
alongside Venezuelan counterparts to constructed oil refineries 
within Syria by the end of the year.135 A majority of these contracts 
have been estimated to be worth several million Euros and focused 
mainly on the reconstruction of electricity equipment; power 
plants; and telecommunication lines.136 One of the contract 
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agreements was to create five gas-powered power plants to 
Northwestern Aleppo, and the Mapna Group, a suspected IRGC 
owned company, is leading this 130 million euro effort137. Iran has 
also secured a contract to restore Damascus’ main electricity 
power plant in Deir Ezzor and Homs138. While Deir Ezzor is still a 
warzone that is occupied by Daesh, Syrian and Iranian forces 
expect its liberation and have begun to discuss reconstruction 
efforts. Syria has also announced that it will import 540 megawatts 
of electricity from Iran to the Latakia Province.139 The IRGC has 
also been granted a contract to build a mobile phone network 
system and this project is to be taken by the Mobile 
Telecommunication Network of Iran.140 The IRGC has secured 
lucrative contracts from Iran as a form of reward for the Iranian 
regime preserving the Assad regime. In response to Iran’s 
assistance, the Assad regime will focus on further strengthening 
economic relations with Iran, which will predominantly favor the 
IRGC for its role in protecting the Assad regime. 141 
Trade 
As the Syrian regime makes further progress in securing its most 
populated areas, Iranian exports within Syria are increasing. In 
2010, the volume of annual trade between Syria and Iran reached 
$545 million dollars, with 30 percent accounting for Syrian exports 
into Iran142. However, it has been reported that trade between Iran 
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and Syria has amounted to about one billion dollars in 2018143. 
However, while the volume of trade has increased between both 
countries, Iranian exports account for about 95 percent of the 
trade.144 In an effort to increase bi-lateral trade relations between 
Iran and Syria, two shipping lines are expected to be built 
connecting both countries. Iran’s trade attaché in Damascus, Ali 
Kazmeni, stated that while Syrian markets are filled with 
merchandize from the Arab world, the Syrian government is keen 
in making Iranian goods the main imports.145 Iranian officials have 
also discussed about the potential of having a free trade agreement 
between both countries.146 Iranian officials have also attempted to 
encourage Iranian businessmen to purchase property in the Shiite 
majority neighborhoods of Damascus147.   
Banking 
Between the discussions with Iranian and Syrian delegates, there 
are aspirations to begin to improve banking relations. While there 
are not official banks that have been established in Syria with 
connections to Iran or IRGC companies, both countries have 
decided that the inclusion of banks will bolster trade relations148. 
The discussion opening banks within Syria of Iranian designation 
can be troubling for Syria because Syria already has borrowed 
billions of dollars from Iran in the past years. If Syria continues to 
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focus on Iranian credit lines then Syria will eventually be at the 
economic mercy of Iran. 
Conclusion 
1979 – 2000 
President Hafez Assad has been in powered after a successful 
military coup for 8 years, Syria’s alliances with Egypt and Iraq 
have fallen through but Syria found an ally with Iran after the 
successful Islamic Revolution of 1979.149 Khomeini reciprocated 
the postitive feelings and looked at Syria as a useful ally to 
empower the Shi’a dominated Southern Lebanon.150 Syria 
supported Iran throughout the Iran-Iraq war by stopping an anti-
Iranian collation from being formed within the Arab League; shut 
down oil pipelines that connected from Iraq into Syria; and began 
to limit trade between both countries.151 Furthermore, Iran would 
offer aid to Syria by providing one million free barrels of oil and 
eight million barrels at 2.50 USD below market value per barrel. 
Iran also did not condemn the Assad regime for Hama massacre of 
1982 in an effort to prioritize a strong relationship.152 During the 
Iran-Iraq war, when Iran suffered embargos from western forces in 
being prevented from buying firearms, Syria became a transit 
country to deliver weapons to Iran. Syria also played an important 
role in the creation of Hizbollah because the Assad regime gave 
passageway for 500 IRGC soldiers to enter southern Lebanon and 
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to train and give guidance to the Shi’a in order to create 
Hizbollah.153 
2000-Present 
After the death of Hafez Assad, Bashar Assad rose to power and 
the relationship between Iran and Syria changed into a strategic 
cooperation. After Syrian forces were removed from Lebanon and 
relations between Syria and other Arab countries suffered due to 
Assad’s support for the Iranian regime, so Iran became one of few 
allies that Syria had.154 During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Iran 
would fund and support Shi’a militias in attacking U.S. forces. 
Syria would allow terrorist forces to use Syria as a transit country 
to passage into Iraq for training.155 After Assad was compelled to 
withdraw 18,000 troops from Lebanon, the Assad regime felt 
“loosing Lebanon” was a humiliating blow, and this incited an 
even stronger relationship between Syria; Iran; and Hizbollah. This 
eventually culminated into the “Axis of Resistance” a defensive 
agreement that would see all three parties support each other in the 
case of Israeli and western incursion. 156 After the Arab Spring, 
Iran ensured that the Assad regime did not fall and it was because 
of Iran’s support that the Assad regime survived the civil war. 
While Syria has not reclaimed all of its territory, the war has 
became one of attrition with Syria receiving full support from Iran 
and Russia. While Syria has survived a potential revolution, it is 
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Iran that has succeed the most, because it has not just gained a 
stronger relationship within Syria, but a foothold in its economy; 




















Chapter V: IRGC and Iranian Socio-Political Soft Power 
Influence in Yemen 
The Importance of Yemen to the IRGC and Iran 
Geographically, Yemen is adjacent to Saudi Arabia. Yemen’s 
ethnic Houthis group, which has beliefs that align with the Shi’a 
sect, has also overtaken the monarchy of Yemen and has replaced 
it with an ethnically dominated quasi-democracy. Yemen also has 
negative views on Saudi Arabia because of a military campaign 
that the KSA (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) has launched on the 
Houthis rebels. Because of Yemen’s geographical location; 
varying ethnic groups that align to Shi’a ideology; and anti-
monarch sentiments make it the optimal ally for Iran. Iran can and 
is using Yemen as a source of recruitment for Iran’s proxy wars 
and a staging ground to conduct operations against the KSA. In 
addition, the IRGC is exploiting the Yemeni war to improve its 
political influence within the country; increase economic trade; and 
establish Iran and the IRGC as a social icon. Iran, through its 
socio-economic activities, is attempting to establish a strategic 
foothold. By having greater presence in Yemen, Iran will be able 
to control the traffic in the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Bab 
Mandal, which links the Arabian Gulf to the Indian Ocean in the 






Mohammad Ali Jafari, the head of the IRGC has admitted that 
Tehran is assisting the Houthi rebels, a move that they had 
previously gone on record on denying158. Jafari has stated that the 
IRGC is keen on assisting the resistance front, whenever one may 
be found, and that the people ad government of Yemen have 
sought the assistance of Iran in the wake of Saudi aggression.159 
The IRGC commander has stated that it will not hesitate to offer 
assistance to the Houthi forces in the future either. IRGC 
commanders have stated that they would also like to increase their 
presence directly in Yemen by embarking in “military advisory 
missions.160” The purpose of these “military advisory missions” is 
to increase their military presence in an attempt to influence the 
countries social; political; and economic decisions. Similar to what 
has occurred in Iraq and Syria, the IRGC plans to replicate 
conditions in Yemen161.  
Weaponry  
Asides from sending military advisors, the IRGC has sent military 
hardware in the forms of weaponry to Yemen. Saudi; Americans; 
and their allies have reported in confiscating weapon shipments 





Riyadh has reported that they have been aware of Iranian led 
support to the Houthi rebels since 2015 and earlier163. The Conflict 
Armament Research, or CAR, center obtained photos and 
information regarding the transfer of weapons in the Arabian 
Peninsula. Between February and March of 2016, coalition 
warships have intercepted vessels that originate from the Iranian 
shipbuilder, Al Mansoor, and have discovered newly manufactured 
weapons. It is speculated the seized weapons were destined for 
Somalia and Yemen and originated from Iran. 164 Furthermore, the 
weapons that were seized has similar matching parts of origin from 





Asides from an increase flow in weaponry, Houthi forces have also 
ascertained sophisticated weaponry, e.g., Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle, or UAV, technology. On February 26, 2017, Houthi 
forces have displayed four UAVs and there has been research 
gathered that these UAVs have been outfitted with explosives to 
detonate when reaching their targets, e.g., Saudi led coalition 
forces166. Upon investigation of the Houthi used drones, the Qasef-
1, it is determined that it is an offshoot of the Ababil-II, a done 
manufactured by the IRGC company, Iran’s Aircraft 
Manufacturing Industrial Company, or HESA167. The drones that 
have been utilized by Houthi forces have been intercepted via a 
known smuggling route in Oman, which denotes that the drones 
are manufactured by Iran and sent to the Houthi forces for 
usage168. The purpose of the UAVs are to enter enemy air space 
and to target MIM-104 Patriot surface to air missile systems. The 
UAVs are outfitted with explosives in order to crash into the 
surface to air missile systems, disabling them169. Outside of aerial 
drone technology, Houthi forces are utilizing unmanned water 
crafts outfitted with explosives to target Saudi coalition naval 
forces. These unmanned boats are known as Water-Borne 
Improvised Explosive Devices, or WBIED(s)170. Unlike other 
weaponry that has been use by the Houthi forces, devices such as 
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the WBIED have not been linked to Iran, however, parts that are 
utilized in constructing these barges have been linked to Iranian 
manufactures. Simia Cable Co. an Iranian cable company, 
specifically, the cable that are used to transmit commands from the 




Houthi forces have used IEDs against Saudi coalition forces, 
however, the level of technology in current IEDs have become 
more sophisticated. New devices created to resemble natural rocks 






Between April 2017 and February 2018, Conflict Armed Research, 
or CAR, have conducted missions in Yemen in which they retrieve 
sophisticated IEDs and have linked their components to Iranian 
origins. Of the components that have been retrieved from the 
aforementioned mission, they have similar builds from the 
captured Jihan 1 cargo vessel that was intercepted in 2013 en route 
from Iran175.  
Pre and Post Arab Spring 
Iran has had a role in the Yemeni polity throughout history, but its 
role has increased drastically from 2004 – 2010 during the Houthi 
conflict with the government176. It was in 2011, when Yemeni 
politics became even more chaotic than it was due to the political 
transition that was being attempted due to the Arab Spring that 
prompted Iran to become greatly involved in the Yemeni Polity. 
lvi 
 
Iran strengthened its alliance with the Houthi rebels through 
ideological; political; financial; and military support.  
Ideological Influence   
Education 
Prior to Iranian intervention within Yemen, Iran has endeavored to 
affect Yemeni politics by encouraging specific ethnic groups to 
study within Iran to undergo political manipulation.177 The Zaidi 
community within Yemen was one of the communities that was 
targeted by Iran. Iran has succeeded in attracting many Zaidi men, 
many of whom are prominent members of the Houthi movement, 
such as Abdul-Malik, the current leader of the Houthis178. The 
Houthi movement has multiple qualities that are borrowed from 
the rhetoric of the Iranian Revolution mentality. In the speech 
given by Abdul-Malik, he references in admiration Khomeini and 
Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah as the leading examples in the 
resistance to both Colonialism and Zionism. Abdul-Malik also 
borrows some slogans from the Iranian Revolution, such as “Death 
to America” and “Death to Israel179.”  
The Iranian regime has also offered scholarships to many Yemeni 
students who belongs to the Houthis to study in Qom. Zaidi 
students who belong to tribes of Sheiks or high school graduates 
were also granted scholarships, of which were all supplied by the 
Iranian embassies180. Those that would receive these scholarships 
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would be given admission to institutions that specialize in the 
education of the principles of the Iranian Revolution and the 
theology of the Twelvers181. There would be large inflows of 
Yemeni students that would decide to study in Iranian institutions, 
and while they were not recipients of scholarships, their living and 
costs and tuitions were covered by Iranian government. The 
students that would study in Iran were essentially transformed to 
focus on bringing a positive Iranian perspective to the Houthi 
movement and Yemeni political system. Many of the students that 
would study in Iran were also prompted to convert to the Twelver 
Shi’a sect and to become advocates of the Twelver sect once the 
students would return to Yemen. Most of the students that would 
come to study in Iran would be received by leaders of the IRGC. 
The students would be distributed to three IRGC camps in Shiraz; 
Mashhad; and Isfahan182 
Religion 
Southern Yemen, long thought to be the stronghold of the Zaidis, 
has also had the support from Iran in reviving its religious 
institutions, which have found large scale support from Iran. 
Iranian Mariji, who are predominantly followers of the Shia’ 
clerics: Ali Sistani and Jawad Shaherstani in Qom, have provided 
religious educational programs and multimedia for the Zaidiss183. 
The religious material that is given to the Zaidis are certified by the 
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University of Religions and Denominations, which is specialized 
to train Twelvers Shi’a or non-Twelver Shi’a184. The intent of the 
Iranian regime was to transform those that study in Iran to return to 
Yemen and to become advocates of Iranian ideology.  
To further Iran’s own influence within Yemen, the Iranian 
embassy has exported many celebrations and conversion tactics 
within Yemen to influence the Zaidi sect that Iran has the most 
influence over. For example, Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, 
ordered the renovation of the Srine of Nasser Haqq, who was a 
Zaidi Imam of the 3rd century, to strengthen the relationship 
between Iran and the Zaidi community185. Iran  
Media  
Iran has attracted prominent Yemeni media professionals to assist 
in promoting a positive Iranian image across various Yemeni 
governorates and have even succeeded in recruiting many 
aforementioned media professionals in working for the Iranian 
media industry186. The Iranian regime has trained over 1300 
Yemeni media professionals who have been sent to Lebanon; Iraq; 
and Iran to specialize in technologies and software for satellite 
broadcasting. They have also been trained to become directors; 
news anchors; writers; and hosts for radio stations187. Iran has also 
funded the launch of several satellite channels that focus on the 
promotion of the Iranian and Houthi ideologies188. Examples of 
lix 
 
these programs are the Mayadeen Maserah channels that have their 
content created in Beirut by Houthis and the Aden Live Channel 
that belongs to the Southern Movement of Yemen189. Iran is also 
using its religious connection with the Zaidi community as a 
gateway to begin to influence the politics of the country by 
embedding religious politics within different political blocs. To be 
more exact, Political Shiism has been taught and preached within 
Shi’a dominant areas to convert those that do not ascribe to the 
Twelver Shiite doctrine190. While not every Zaidi member follows 
the Twelver sect, the Zaidi community is aware of Iranian 
conversion efforts and permits Iranian activities to continue, which 
will give Iran a social foothold within Iran191.  
Economic Soft Power 
Bilateral Economic Agreements 
After the Houthi rebels and their allies deposed the then president 
of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, Iran signed joint economic 
agreements with the Houthi rebels in the oil; electricity; aviation; 
and sea transit field192. These agreements also involved a pledge 
from the Iranian petroleum sector to provide petrol products of a 
year and to establish electricity plants in the provinces of Ade, 
Hodeida, and Taiz. In addition, Iran will also repair electricity 
transmission lines between Marib and Sana193. The Iranian regime 
has also vowed to expand the port of Hodeida, set a line of credit 
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to supply Yemen with whatever products they need, dispatch 
Iranian experts to help repair all Yemeni infrastructures, and create 
a sky bridge to improve trade between the two countries194. These 
agreements were a blatant declaration that Iran is more than just a 
supporter of the Houthi rebels, they are a bonafide ally. The 
policies were never implemented, however, because on March 26, 
2015, Decisive Storm, a Saudi-led Arab coalition against the 
Houthi rebels stopped the agreements from ever being put into 
place.195  
Further Research regarding economic soft power must be 
observed 
Due to the current volatile situation that is happening in Yemen, 
and the likelihood that conflict will continue, the IRGC and other 
Iranian entities cannot commence in economic soft powers. This is 
because with a lack of structure in Yemen, the possibility for 
economic gain with the IRGC will result in a minimal return. The 
Saudi-led coalition is also a deterrent to Iranian economic 
influence because any programs that can aid in stimulating 
agricultural; construction; and school programs are possible 
targets. Until the Yemeni conflict has a political transition and a 
stable social order is established, the IRGC will not be able to 




Post Iranian Revolution 
Historically, Yemen has always been an essential city in the 
Iranian polity, since the Hemieri dynasty, in which the Persian 
Empire vied over control of the region that is now known as 
Yemen from the Roman Empire196. During the 20th century, Iran 
and Yemen had limited interaction until the conclusion of the 
Yemeni revolution against Zaidi rule, which only saw that Shah 
give marginal support to the Royal forces197. During the Shah’s 
dominion, Iran had little interaction with the Shi’a dominated south 
because Southern Yemen was affiliated with the Communist 
Eastern Bloc while Iran were allies with the United States. 
However, after the revolution of 1979, that all began to change.  
Post 1979 revolution 
After the Iranian Revolution, Iranian involvement within Yemen 
began to increase by the invitation of Zaidi students to receive 
greater education at the University within Iran; Syria; and 
Lebanon198. Iran’s intention was to attract Shi’a elites into studying 
at institution that support the political revolution ideology that led 
to the transition of government in Iran in an effort to export the 
Iranian Revolution199. While Iran began to have a better 
relationship with Southern Yemen, Northern Yemen had little 
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connection to the new Islamic Republic because of the close 
relationship between Saddam’s regime and Northern Yemen. 
1990: Yemeni Unification  
After the unification of northern and southern Yemen, Iran began 
to increase its socio-political influence within Yemen. This is 
because GCC countries had severed its ties with Yemen after their 
support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Iran began an religious 
initiative to promote the Shi’a Twelver sect and to increase 
interaction with the Zaidi Shi’a community200. Examples of these 
activities were inviting prominent Zaidi community members to 
conferences; Iranian celebrations; and a greater exportation of 
Iranian politics to the Zaidi community. 
Arab Spring 
From 2004-2010, the Iranian regime supported the Houthi rebels 
with their conflict against the Yemeni government. But Iranian 
involvement with both the Houthi rebels an Yemen proliferated 
during and after the Arab Spring. Because of the political; social; 
economic; and religious uncertainties that has resulted in the 
difficult political transitions since the overthrow of the Saleh 
regime, Yemen is in a chaotic state. The Iranian regime is 
supporting the Houthi rebels in order to strengthen their alliance 
and to influence the group through socio-political means. Prior to 
the emergence of the Houthi rebels, Iran has supported the south of 
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Yemen, as relationships between Tehran and the former Southern 
Yemeni politician, Ali Salem Beid, were warm. However, tensions 
arose between the former and latter because of Iranian support for 
the Houthi rebels, who have attempted to take control of the South 
of Yemen201.  
2015 to Present 
Iran and the Houthi forces have attempted to initiate economic; 
social; and political agreements, all of which see Iran taking 
contracts and exploiting Yemen for the resources and using their 
people and territory as satellite regions for the interests. However, 
because of the ongoing war between Houthi rebels and the Saudi 
led coalition, Iran is not able to take a proactive role because the 
risk of involvement in a potential conflict with Saudi Arabia will 
cause strain on Iran and their attempt to agglomerate power within 






































Chapter VI: Conclusion  
Overview  
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Crops, or the IRGC, has been an 
apparatus of the Iranian regime that has created a large scale of 
destruction and destabilization throughout the Middle East. By 
utilizing its military prowess; ideological manipulation; and 
economic soft power, the IRGC has achieved in promoting their 
interests in Iraq; Syria; and Yemen.  
Research Question Response 
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Cords has not made it discreet 
that it is attempting to export its revolution, as the concept of the 
Iranian ideology exportation is an integral portion of the Iranian 
Constitution. However, instead of using force or subversion to 
spread its belief, the IRGC has used soft power to accrue influence 
internationally. But when referencing that case studies of Iraq; 
Syria; and Yemen, it is not a political Islam agenda that Iran has 
been supporting, but instead a pro-Iranian stance. In each of the 
case studies, the IRGC has used military power; ideology; and 
economic soft power to improve its own positioning in the country 
case studies and to allow a positive Iranian stance to grow. In 
conclusion, Iran is not infiltrating other countries to export its 
revolution, but instead it is infiltrating other countries to establish a 
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foothold and to accrue power to eventually become a regional 
hegemony. 
Research Graph 





Ideology Military Power Economic Soft 
Power  
Iraq • - Religious training 
(Twelver Shia Sect) 
• - Funded Education 
programs 
• - Popular Mobilization 
Unit (PMU) 
• - Parliamentary 
Economic Support 
• - Controls 1/6th of 
GDP through service 
contracts 
 
Syria • - Scholarships for 
Education programs 
• - Shi’a holy site 
renewal programs 
• - Alawite allegiance 
• - Russian connections 
maintain support from 
Kremlin 
• - Military advisors and 
militia coordinator 
• - Reconstruction 
contracts belong to 
IRGC.  




Yemen • - Iranian funded 
education 
• - Shi’a site renewal 
programs 
• - Military Advisors  
• - Major armament 
trade partner 
• - Bilateral Trade 
agreements. 






















The Iranian regime has utilized Ideology is a driving force to 
improve the interaction between Iran and Iraq at a social and 
political level. However, there is speculation amongst the religious 
leaders of Iraq that Iran is attempting to establish velayat-e faghih, 
a concept that would concede religious leadership to Iran. The 
Grand Ayatollah of Iraq, Ali Sistani, is one such leader that is 
hesitant of allowing Iranian religious influence to expand, and 
because of Sistani’s popularity amongst Shi’a followers, The 
Iranian regime cannot dispose of him. Therefore, Iran has funded 
the creation of universities that focuses on the installment of 
Iranian ideology and philosophy into the youth of Iraq. The IRGC 
has also constructed improve tourist facilities for pilgrims within 
Iraq. Iran has also donated to the construction of Islamic centers; 
schools; and medical facilities within Shi’a neighborhoods in order 
to improve relations between the regime and the people. Iran has 
also begun to groom potential spiritual successors to Sistani that 
have warmer opinions towards the regime, as Sistani’s age will see 
him pass on. Asides from religion and education, the Iranian 
regime has also established media projects to broadcast a positive 
image of the Iranian regime as the ‘protectors’ of Iraq. While 
religion and education are both important tools of mobilization, 
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they are only pertinent to the religious and youth. Media is a tool 
that will be dispersed to everyone. While Iran does not have 
absolute ideological dominance within Iraq, it has taken the 
appropriate measures to improve its image and influence. Through 
religion; education; and media, Iran will be able to create a cult of 
personality that see’s Iran as an ally and this warmer interpretation 
will be able to bridge better relationships between both countries.  
Syria 
Unlike Iraq, Syria is a state is ruled by an Alawite minority, an off 
short of the Shi’a sect, with a Sunni majority. Regardless, the 
IRGC Quds force has altered the composition of the entire country 
by bringing in Shi’a militia fighters. These fighters are tasked with 
the preservation of holy sites to the Shi’a faith. The importance of 
these fighters is that while they are in Syria, they create a new 
power dynamic that see’s neighborhoods and entire cities under the 
control of Shi’a adherents, creating a sectarian power inflow from 
Sunni members of the community to the Shi’a militia fighters. Iran 
has also created education programs in Syria in the form of 
constructing schools and universities. In addition, Iran is 
constructing Shi’a religious culture centers that promote the 
Persian language and Iranian ideals, such as being anti-American 
and Israeli. Iran has also created a cultural Basij organization that 
focuses creating a positive Iranian image within poorer parts of 
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Syria. The Basij organization also is used to suppress protests, and 
with training from the IRGC Quds force, the Basij organization 
could be an important role in maintaining Assad in power and 
ensuring that protests do not progress as they did during the offset 
of the Arab Spring. Just like in Iraq, the ideological influence that 
Iran has within Syria will ensure a positive image within the 
people. In addition, by promoting religious; ideological and 
political concepts that are pushed by Iran onto the Syrian 
population, Iran can use these similarities to improve their 
influence within Syria as a whole.  
Yemen 
The level of influence that Iran has within Yemen is not 
comparable to that that it has in Syria and Iraq. However, that is 
not to say that there is not a level of interaction within between 
Iranian ideology and Yemen. Prior to the onset of the current 
Yemeni civil war, Iran has sponsored members of the Zaidi 
community, a shi’a based ethnic group, to come study within Iran. 
These community members would receive boarding and 
scholarships on the behalf of the Iranian government with the goal 
of radicalizing the members into forming a zeal of loyalty to 
Iranian ideologies. When these members would return to their 
community of origin, they would also espouse the teachings that 
they receive from Iran to their community at large. Even when the 
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Houthi rebels gained powers, the Houthi would use terminology 
that is traditional to the Iranian Revolution mentality. Currently, 
Iran is still offering scholarships to Houthi youths in an attempt to 
continue the creation of the ‘resistance’ mentality into the new 
generation. The Zaidi community has also had a large inflow of 
donations in the form of twelve sect propaganda so that they may 
be converted. These efforts have been supported by Iran and Iraqi 
clerics. The Iranian regime has also begun projects to reconstruct 
damaged Shi’a shrines within territory that has been traditionally 
occupied by the Zaidi community, as well. Iran has also trained 
and educated Houthi members to run media outlets that promote a 
positive Iranian identity in an attempt to greater improve the 
perception of Iran throughout Yemen. The goals of Iran within 
Yemen is to ensure that society has a positive outlook on Iran 
because the greater the reception to Iranian influence, the greater 
the power that Iran will have over Yemeni society.  
Military Power 
Iraq 
The destabilization or the increased destabilization of a region and 
nation state is a tatic that the IRGC utilizes to create an 
environment in which the IRGC or the Iranian regime may exploit 
to serve their purposes. For example, the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guard Corps has permeated into the military apparatus of multiple 
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foreign forces. The aforementioned infiltration takes the form of 
supplying militaries with financial aid or equipment, which creates 
dependency on the Iranian regime. The IRGC also imports foreign 
fighters to partake in the conflicts of other countries in order to 
establish a dependency to Iran to continue to supply fighters. The 
overall objective of the IRGC is to establish dependency to both 
the IRGC and Iran by creating or supporting a destabilized region 
to supply weaponry and troops or to create a war economy.  
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the IRGC trained and supplied 
Shi’a militias within Iraq to combat the United States and their 
coalition. While the assistance that the IRGC gave to these militias 
was not substantial, the majority was exposed to Iranian support 
and this would contribute to the creation of warmed opinions 
towards Iran and its regime. Post Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq’s 
military was disorganized and relied on rag tag militias. So when 
Daesh rose to influence and began to attack and conquer different 
Iraqi cities, the Iraqi military was not prepared and ultimately 
succumbed to the violence of Daesh. In response to the increasing 
violence within Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani responded with a 
fatwa and created the Shi’a majority Popular Mobilization Unit. 
The PMU was further supported by the IRGC in terms of advanced 
training; funding; and weapon shipments. Eventually, the PMU 
became the largest military apparatus in the entirety of Iraq and 
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would eventually be integrated as a permanent wing of the Iraqi 
military. The PMU is now the largest and most organized branch 
of the Iraqi military, and due to its connection to Iran and its Shi’a 
majority membership, it has the possibility to take control of the 
Iraqi polity. What is the most beneficial for Iran is that the Iraqi 
Shi’a majority have accepted and approved a majority of the 
actions of the PMU, whether they are military actions or political 
inclusion. If the PMU is able to hold the most power within Iraq by 
using sectarianism as a basis for their right to mobilize Iraq, then a 
sudden change in power will occur. The traditional establishment 
of the Sunni power conflux will be replaced by a Shi’a regime that 
has connections to Iran. In the past, Iran has supported political 
organizations that have promoted a positive relationship with Iran. 
But with the sudden ascension of the PMU to power, the IRGC 
will train former PMU commanders to run for positions of political 
power. The PMU already has a positive perception among the Iraqi 
population, so succeeding politically against the current regime 
that has been interpreted to have failed the Iraqi people is 
plausible. IF the PMU is to secure a high level of positions, then 
the PMU will transcend being a military organizations and will be 




Syria has experienced severe instability as a result of the Syrian 
Civil War that begun in 2011. The current leader of Syria, Bashar 
al-Assad, is an Alewitee minority is an offshoot of the Shia’a sect, 
and is an ally of the Iranian regime. The IRGC sent its Quds force, 
a special force that is designated to train and supply foreign 
fighters to the Syrian front to act as military advisors. The Quds 
force has offered the Assad regime a better understanding on how 
to manipulate social media; how to suppress protests; create IEDs; 
and other techniques that the IRGC learned during the suppression 
of the 1999 Green Movement. With this new training, it will be 
assured that the Assad regime will act with greater prejudice when 
faced with a protest in order to stop similar demonstrations that led 
to the 2011 civil war. The close cooperation between the Quds 
force and the Syrian military also creates a closer relationship 
between Syria and Iran that will increase their allegiance to one 
another. Iran has also been included throughout the peace talks that 
are focused on ending the civil war. By being a part of 
negotiations, Iran could influence the Assad regime to accept or 
refuse negotiations based on the fact if they see the results 
beneficial. Further influence that Iran has is seen through their 
relationship with Russia. While the Assad regime and Russia have 
traditionally been allies, it is the relationship between Assad and 
Russia that should be examined because Iran and Russia have not 
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cooperated as closely as they do during the Syrian Civil War. Iran 
uses revenue from their oil sales to buy Russian weapons to 
transport to Syria, and when Russia is not able to send the weapons 
to Syria, they transport the arms to Iran so that the Quds force may 
deliver them. Iran has also bought materials to greater their 
capabilities of nuclear material cultivation to greater their nuclear 
program. The close relationship that was cultivated between Russia 
and Iran will continue past the Syrian Civil War, and with 
increased western antagonism towards Iran and Russia, they will 
only improve relationships with one another. With Russia being a 
great power in the UN, as well, Iran will have gained an ally that 
can veto any resolution that the US attempts to pass.  
Yemen 
The Yemeni Civil War has been ongoing since 2015 when the 
Houthi rebels overtook the capital of Yemen, Sana’a. The Houthi, 
an ethnic group that is predominantly Shi’a, has received support 
from Iran and the IRGC in the form of both advising and 
weaponry. The Quds force have trained the Houthi rebels in IED 
construction and they have supplied the rebels with a plethora of 
small arms and drones. One of the drones that have been used are 
automated boats that are outfitted with explosives that are utilized 
to attack coalition forces and freighter shipments. The Quds force 
have also supplied rockets to the rebels to launch at the Saudi 
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Arabian front. Yemen is an important ally to Iran because not only 
is Iran gaining favor with the rebel forces, but by increasing their 
presence they are begin given direct access to the border of Saudi 
Arabia. Iran has gone on record in stating that Saudi Arabia is the 
number one enemy of the regime, and by utilizing the Houthi 
rebels as a proxy force, Iran has begun to attack Saudi Arabia in 
the form of UAVs; rocket launches; and frater shipment attacks.  
Economy 
Iraq 
Iran and Iraq are both essential trade partners, with Iran exporting 
various commodities to Iraq. But trade between both are not equal, 
as Iran holds more economic influence over Iraq than in vice versa. 
And Iranian economic influence has steadily increased since the 
deposition of Saddam Hussein, as Iranian foundations; bonyads; 
and other economic apparatuses have expanded their influence 
within the Iraqi borders. These aforementioned government 
controlled economic establishments, many of which are ran by the 
IRGC, employ unfair economic practices that results in the surplus 
economic extraction from their Iraqi patrons. By being tax exempt 
and receiving preferential trade agreements, Iran grows in wealth 
as they continue to trade with Iraq.  Iran also established 
technological infrastructure within Iraq, such as creating 
communication networks, of which are controlled by Iran within 
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Iraq. Iran has also received construction contracts to improve the 
Iraqi infrastructure, mainly in Shi’a dominated areas, by building 
stadiums; neighborhoods; and other vital construction projects. 
Iran has also opened more banks within Iraq and has created credit 
lines, of which can have high interest rates, so that Iraq may 
borrow money in an effort to improve their infrastructure. While 
all these aforementioned economic practices seem like a normal 
part of foreign relations, they are a means to control power through 
economic practices. All the establishments that were mentioned are 
Iranian controlled, which means that if Iraq were to abide by any 
agreements that Iran does not agree to, Iran will have leverage over 
the entirety of Iraq by shutting down vital services. In addition, all 
the companies that do business within Iraq are almost all controlled 
by the IRGC. With Iraqi patronage, the IRGC will have the ability 
to fund their own operations in order to garner more influence and 
power within the foreign realm. 
Syria 
With Syria suffering from a crumbling infrastructure due to their 
civil war, Iran has offered to aid in reconstruction efforts. IRGC 
controlled companies have spearheaded this cause, as construction 
companies that are owned and operate by the IRGC have received 
exclusive contracts to rebuild neighborhoods and other vital 
buildings, e.g., hospitals; schools; banks; and government 
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buildings. Iran and Syria have also improved trading relations, as 
Iran has supplied Syria with various necessities from food to 
commodities due to the limiting trade partners that Syria has from 
international pressure. Trading between both countries will 
continue to grow as both regimes have agreed upon on signing 
exclusive trade deals. Iran has also opened a credit line into Syria 
so that companies may borrow money, even though there will be 
high interest rates, so that the infrastructure of Syria may be 
restarted. Similar to what occurred in Iraq, Iran is profiting from 
the essential victory of the Assad regime in the form of exclusive 
economic agreements. Companies that will be helping Syria 
rebuild are all IRGC owned, which will only increase the influence 
of the IRGC even more.  
Yemen 
Before the Yemeni Civil war began, the Houthi rebels and Iran 
have agreed upon several economic trade agreements. OF them, 
there was an agreement that Iran would help reconstruct their 
crippled infrastructure. They would also open up a line of credit so 
that Yemeni businesses may grow, even though it would be under 
high interest rates. And that there would be increased trades 
between the rebels and the Iranian regime. However, because of 
the attacks led by the Saudi coalition, these aforementioned trade 
agreements never came to fruition. It should be noted that there is 
lxxix 
 
limited research done on the subject of economic relations between 
Iran and the Houthi rebels, so further research is required within 
this field.  
Outlook for the Future 
The research that was conducted establishes a clear correlation 
between both Iran and the IRGC and their interests in foreign 
countries that are destabilized in an effort to increase their own 
power inflow. By using ideological influences, Iran is able to 
create a societal and cultural link between countries, in which it 
has the dominant position. For example, religion, specifically 
Twelver Shi’ism has been a tool of influence that Iran exports to 
foreign countries. IN doing so, Iran correlates its religion with its 
revolutionary ideology and the necessity of the establishment of an 
Islamic theocracy. The IRGC and the Iranian regime use military 
soft power to destabilize the security apparatus of a country by 
creating cliental states that rely on Iranian military power to 
maintain the training and equipment of another military. Because 
of this, the country that is being “assisted” by Iran becomes 
dependent and could be coerced into maintaining pro-Iranian 
relations to ensure their own security. Economic soft power is 
linked to the business sector of a country. When both Iran and the 
IRGC become influential in these sectors, they establish trade deals 
that favor them the most; establish lines of credits with large 
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interest rates; and other practices that ensure that both the IRGC 
and Iran gain economically while their partner loses. If Iran is 
allowed to continue this model of exploitation, then advisory states 
such as Saudi Arabia will suffer because Iran will have secured the 
position of regional hegemon. 
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